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Abstract: This paper explores how atheism relates to national pride. Previous research reports the
strong positive relationship between religiosity and national pride. Inversely, it can be assumed
that atheists feel less national pride. Whether this assumption holds true and whether the perceived
relevance of religiosity for values perceived as fundamental for national pride is a national-specific or
a global phenomenon will be investigated here by examining attitudes towards atheists and assessing
cross-nationally how proud atheists truly are of their countries. The data reveals cross-country
differences in both respects. In highly religious countries, prejudice against atheists is pronounced,
while atheists’ feelings of national pride indeed tend to be weaker. But what exactly predicts atheists’
feelings of national pride? For a Multilevel Analysis of this question, this article uses the ONBound
database offering cumulated and harmonized data from international survey programs as well as
linked country-level data on national identities and religion. Results identify countries’ ideological
background as one of the crucial country-level predictors for national pride among atheists. In highly
religious countries, people who deny religion also seem to possess ambivalent feelings towards their
country. In turn, if the state ideology opposes religion, atheists tend to support the combination of
anti-religiousness and patriotism.
Keywords: atheism; national pride; multilevel analysis; ONBound
1. Introduction
There was recently a startling reminder of the importance of national pride as an
area of research in exploring societies’ political climates when on 6 January 2021, the
world watched stunned as a nationalist group calling itself the “Proud Boys” figured
prominently in the storming of the U.S. Capitol. Many studies have appeared lately on
the interplay between nationalism, patriotism, and religiosity (see e.g., Muldoon et al.
2007; Brubaker 2012; Trittler 2017). Recent waves of migration have brought religion back
into the debates regarding what constitutes a nation in Europe. As a result, right-wing
national-populistic parties have made attempts at addressing religious people by implying
proximity to religious content and teachings. The focus of this research is typically on
national context-specific religions or denominations and on the question as to how they
moderate values. In many Western countries, the most rapidly growing group can be
labelled “those who do not believe” or “atheists1” who, nevertheless, have thus far not
gotten much attention in this respect. This article seeks to fill this gap by assessing atheists’
national pride.
“No, I don’t know that atheists should be considered as citizens, nor should they be
considered patriots. This is one nation under God.”
George H.W. Bush, press conference in August 19872
This statement was made by Bush more than thirty years ago, not least because he knew
that a large proportion of his potential electorate would agree. Indeed, ongoing public
debates as well as social surveys have shown that in the US there was and remains the
widely held belief that atheism and patriotism are mutually exclusive (see e.g., Milne 2012).
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Previous research has evinced a strong relationship between religiosity and national
pride (see e.g., Brubaker 2012; Trittler 2017). Especially true for the US, but also for other
countries, data shows that religious people tend to be particularly proud of their countries.
At the same time, prejudices regarding atheists are multifaceted and prevalent. It is a
commonly shared assumption that people who do not believe in any kind of god inevitably
also do not believe in the set of values perceived as fundamental for being good citizens
and are therefore not expected to feel national pride (Gervais 2013).
This article will explore the openly discussed assumption, found predominantly in the
US, that atheists are no patriots and determine, first, whether this is a largely American or a
global phenomenon and, second, whether there is some truth to this and atheists really are
less proud of their countries. If they are, the obvious question is: why? To answer this last
question, I will look for factors that shape societies on a country-level such as the countries’
ideological background, the effect of church and state relationship, the general societal
level of religiosity, and religious pluralization for atheists’ feelings of national pride.
The analyses are based on various international survey data as well as societal-level
data sources that were cumulated, harmonized, and linked by ONBound Project3.
As mentioned above, the section following the introduction defines atheism and
explains atheists’ internationally varying appearance and their perception by others. To
give an idea about the nature of prejudices against atheists, the third section provides
an overview of cross-national attitudes towards atheists, while shedding some light on
their roots. The next section considers the interplay of (non-)religiosity and national pride.
Thereafter, Section 5 provides an exploration of the theoretical assumptions of why and
how individual-level and country-level indicators might predict atheists’ national pride,
and hypotheses are formulated accordingly followed by the data and method section. The
results section starts with some descriptive analyses of atheists around the globe and their
levels of national pride as well as national attitudes towards them based on ONBound data,
before turning to a Multilevel Analysis on what predicts atheists’ national pride. In the last
two sections, I will discuss the results and suggest an outlook.
2. Defining Atheists
The word “atheism” comes from the Greek words “a” meaning without and “theos”
meaning god. It describes either the lack of belief in the existence of a god or the belief in the
non-existence of a god or gods (Blackburn 1996, in The Oxford Dictionary of Philosophy).
As simple as this definition seems, as heterogeneous are individuals’ manifestations of
unbelief, which may be as complex and diversified as religious belief itself (Pruyser 1974,
p. 195). Consequently, terms for non-religiosity used in scientific literature and public
discourse over the last decades are also numerous: atheism, new atheism4, agnosticism,
non-religion, a-religion, irreligion, secularism, non-theism, anti-religion, unbelief, exis-
tential cultures, and humanism, just to mention the most prominent terms. To make the
situation worse, these terms may mean different things to different people at different
points in time. This is because they were made up by different social actors and not
by social scientists within one systematic conceptual framework.5 All of which entails a
measurement challenge for social science research.
Previous research based on different methods found different types of non-religious
people in survey data (Chaves 2010; Bechert 2018; Davie 1990, 1994, 2000; Edlund 2013;
Jones et al. 2011; Pearce and Denton 2011; Stolz et al. 2014; Voas 2009). Three main types can
be distinguished6. Type 1 does not belong to any church but believes in a god. Grace Davie
explored this phenomenon of “believing without belonging” in great detail and called
these people the “nones” (Davie 1994, 2012). In addition, the reversed phenomenon exists
(Type 2): people who do not believe but belong for different reasons (Davie 2012). Ethnic
affiliations might be one of these reasons. Both groups clearly distinguish themselves
from Type 3, those who neither believe nor belong. In this paper, I am focusing on Type 3
and under the term “atheists”, collect all those who do not belong to any church, do not
believe in any god or gods, and do not hesitate to say so. However, it must be considered
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that atheists appear differently around the globe. In religious research, they are usually
distinguished as either passive or active atheists.
Passive atheists may or may not refer to themselves as atheists; they tend to be rather
indifferent towards religion; may be uninformed and/or perhaps may have never actually
been confronted with the question of believing or not; or simply do not care at all about
religion. They are, what Lüchau (2010) describes as not anti-religious but simply areligious.
Or, as Weber expresses it so poetically, “religiously unmusical” (Svatos et al. 1998, p. 548).
Active atheists, in contrast, are much more likely to speak of themselves as atheists. They
very consciously chose to reject religion and tend to openly react against religion in the
public sphere. Whether a person becomes a passive or active atheist highly depends on
socio-cultural background.
Several researchers have observed these different types of atheists across countries and
found a clear pattern: religious cultures produce more active atheists than secular cultures
(Bruce 1996; Zuckerman 2012). Zuckerman (2012), for example, contrasted irreligious
orientations in the US and Scandinavia. He found that American atheists much more
frequently label themselves as atheists and tend to be much more critical and negative
about religion and religious people. One reason, he argues, is that many American atheists—
and that is most certainly generally true for atheists in religious countries—might have gone
through a rather painful process of apostasy. Apostasy describes the individual process
or the very moment of losing faith, often accompanied by the hurting feelings of loss and
anger about having believed in what is now perceived as lies. It is usually accompanied by
a coming-out towards family and friends that involves coping with their reactions. All this
creates strong emotions that need a sort of release valve, frequently found in active atheism
and in the attempt to convince family and friends of a secular worldview. This mechanism
is reflected by the appearance of the “New Atheism” movement at the beginning of the 21st
century. It became visible as a predominantly American countermovement against religious
fundamentalism and garnered attention especially by producing a huge body of literature
that criticizes religion as irrational and proclaims a common-sense based worldview (see,
for example, Harris 2005; Dawkins 2006; Hitchens 2008). The New Atheism movement
even has the political agenda to reduce the influence of religion in the public sphere (Kettell
2013), which is causing polarization in American society.
Reacting only matters, however, if there is something to react against. In secular
countries, there is usually no religious socialization during the childhood years, neither is
there any social pressure to be religious. People who did experience religious socialization
tend to “grow out of it” as they become older and more reflective (Zuckerman 2012, p. 10).
But this development, though, proceeds quietly and sometimes even unnoticed. Mostly,
there is no anger, no fight, and no reason to proselytize to others on behalf of atheism since
religion and churches usually are not perceived as doing them any harm. There is then
no reason for hard feelings and no reason for the individual to reflect in great detail upon
what being non-religious actually means. Bullivant (2012, p. 100) gets right to the point by
stating: “After all, it would be strange to take one’s atheism seriously in a society where no
one took theism seriously.” Riis (1994) states in this context that “most secular Americans
are more likely to be convinced atheists, whereas most secular Scandinavians are more
likely to be lukewarm agnostics7”.
Why did I not come up with a less ideologically occupied term? Regardless of the term used
for survey categorization or what type of non-believers people would declare themselves
to be, and regardless of whether active or passive, essential for the research subjects in this
article is that they do not believe in any god (a-theos). I could have come up with another
term for the research group, one less ideologically occupied, though that would have been
a sham, since it would not have changed the essential. What needs to be kept in mind,
however, is that when it comes to people’s attitudes towards atheists, we do not know
what kind of atheist respondents have in mind. We can only assume that it is the type that
is prevailing in their countries, partly dependent on the general level of societal religiosity
pervasive in that country.
Religions 2021, 12, 648 4 of 24
3. Cross-National Attitudes towards Atheists
What do people really think about atheists? A great many research studies over the last
decades have found anti-atheist attitudes across the world. This also pertains to formerly
atheist countries such as the Russian Federation where national or ethnic identity is closely
connected to the majority religion of Orthodox Christianity and where we see a lack of
ideological pluralism (Knorre 2014; Karpov et al. 2012). Nevertheless, the research field
is most prominent in the US. A Gallup poll conducted in 1999 asked Americans if their
party would nominate a generally well-qualified person, whether they would vote for that
person, if it was a woman (95% agreed), a black person (92% agreed), a homosexual (59%
agreed), or an atheist. Only 49% agreed on voting for an atheist (Gallup 2000, p. 54). In the
“Faith Matters Survey” of 2011 (Putnam et al. 2011), 9% of respondents disagree strongly
and another 20% somewhat disagree with the statement that atheists should be allowed to
teach in public schools. Mudd et al. (2015) state that “Atheists are among the least liked,
least desired, and most excluded individuals in America” and underpins this statement
with different studies, offering a variety of evidence for anti-atheist attitudes, including the
study of Edgell et al. (2006) who find that atheists are less likely to be publicly and privately
accepted than any others from a long list of ethnic, religious, and other minority groups.
They find that Americans are reluctant to let their children marry an atheist (47.6% would
disapprove) because they view atheists as the group that least agrees with their vision of
American society. According to data from “The American Mosaic Project” (Stewart 2014),
atheists in America moved to second last place in both respects in 2014, right after Muslims.
These findings demonstrate that although acceptance for atheists has somewhat increased
during the last years, anti-atheist attitudes were and remain prevalent in the US.
Compared to American research in this field, cross-national studies are rare. Gervais
et al. (2017) found anti-atheist attitudes across religiously diverse societies, including coun-
tries with Buddhist, Christian, Hindu, and non-religious majorities, thus demonstrating
that they are not exclusive to Abrahamic or monotheistic majority societies (Gervais et al.
2017, p. 3). Notably, they also find global intuitive anti-atheist attitudes among atheists
themselves. The reason for this might be based in the cross-culturally varying distribution
of “active” and “passive” atheists as explained above. In countries where passive atheism
prevails, even passive atheists may reject active atheists because they do not comprehend
anti-religious actions of whatever kind as they see no threat in religion. We will see later
what kind of cross-national attitudes ONBound data reveals.
Where does this obviously deep-rooted aversion emanate from? An answer can easily be
found in the literature: It arises from deeply rooted distrust against people who do not
feel their actions to be morally judged by any god and, thus, do not fear facing any
consequences for amoral actions (see e.g., Gervais 2011; Mudd et al. 2015). This question
of whether there can be morality without religious belief has been discussed for a long
time, from the ancient Chinese philosopher Mozi to Plato and Dostoyevsky (for a more
detailed overview, see Gervais et al. 2017) until the present, where the question “Can you
be good without God” does not seem to lose its relevance in American public debates8
(see e.g., Smith and Halligan 2020; Zuckerman 2012). Durkheim got to the heart of the
issue by defining religion as “moral community” (Durkheim [1912] 2001). In his line of
argumentation, the religious community sets the behavioral norms every member needs
to comply with. That makes religion the most important condition for social integration
and social cohesion (Siegers 2019). People who do not belong to the “moral community”
and therefore are not bound to conform to the community’s behavioral norms inevitably
provoke distrust, mixed with feelings of anger, and, last but not least, envy towards the
liberty these individuals are perceived to take. Thereby, it seems secondary whether it
is one’s own moral community or based on another religion, as long as it is a rule-based
moral community, as shown by studies which found that there is generally more trust
towards believers of other denominations than towards non-believers (Hall et al. 2015).
One reason why anti-atheist attitudes are so deeply seated may be early religious
indoctrination. In countries where there is a close church and state relationship, the church
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has a strong influence on children in their phase of socialization via the school system,
which transports the fundamental belief of the inextricable interlinkage of moral values
and religiosity. Many school systems around the world such as in Ireland and Russia
(Hyland and Bocking 2015; Mawhinney 2015; Köllner 2016) have been strongly criticized
for systematic early religious indoctrination.
In a nutshell: moral values are generally perceived as fundamental for being part of
any community. Consequently, those who are religious may perceive a doubled group-
threat towards atheists. First, they are not part of the religious community. Second, as
atheists are assumed to lack loyalty and the will to comply to social rules, they are also
not discerned as members of the national community. This also explains why they are not
expected to feel national pride.
4. Religion and National Pride
The core question this paper asks is whether atheists identify with their countries, more
specifically, whether they feel national pride. National pride, also referred to as patriotism
(e.g., Rose 1985; Kosterman and Feshbach 1989), is one component of the multidimensional
concept of national identity, the measurement of which is an endeavor in itself (see, for
example, Sinnot 2005). National pride taps into the affective dimension of national identity
by addressing “feelings of closeness to and pride in one’s country and its symbols” (Citrin
et al. 2001, p. 74). The concept is of general interest since positive emotions towards
one’s country may serve as a uniting element for societies. This mechanism, however,
also has a dark side. While love and affection towards one’s own country and people
carries a positive connotation, borders with the concept of nationalism, called “the bloody
brother of patriotism” by Schaar (1981, p. 285), are blurry. In contrast to patriotism that
stresses in-group favoritism, nationalism includes out-group hostility and sentiments of
superiority towards others (Kosterman and Feshbach 1989, p. 271). These “others” can
be other countries or, according to social identity theory (Tajfel and Turner 1979), people
within society identified as the out-group. Studies have shown that strong feelings of
national identity tend to increase the trust individuals have in their fellow citizens (Miller
1995, p. 140), making them value group welfare over individualism in decision-making
processes (Kramer and Brewer 1984, p. 1045; Doosje et al. 1999) or making it more likely
that individuals feel empathy and engage in “helping behavior” towards those regarded as
in-group members (Theiss-Morse 2009). At the same time, they might, however, lead to the
exclusion of other parts of society such as—depending on the nature of the society—atheists
or religious people. To what extent patriotism and nationalism are actually separable is
the topic of an ongoing debate. The argument against the theoretical separation is that
identity development based on in-group solidarity hardly ever takes place without any
out-group differentiation.9 A web-probing experiment conducted in 2014 supports this
argument by convincingly showing that capturing both concepts separated from each other
through measurement is unrealistic. Qualitative interviews demonstrate that respondents
perceive an overlap of concepts within the question whether they are proud of their country
(Meitinger 2018).
What about the interplay of religion and national pride? Based on results from cross-
national European data analyses, Wright and Reeskens (2012) claim that these go hand-in-
hand. Especially when societal religiosity is high, they find religious people to be proud of
their countries because they identify with its religious tradition (Wright and Reeskens 2012,
p. 20f). Storm (2011) sees a link based on similar underlying values and points out strong
correlations that have been found between nationalism and conservatism, traditionalism,
obedience, intolerance of ambiguity, and authoritarianism (Altemeyer 1981; Jost et al. 2003;
Schwartz 1992).
The historic roots for the connection between religiosity and national pride run deep.
First, religion facilitated modern state-formation (Wright and Reeskens 2012). In Israel,
it even builds the fundament, but in many other countries, religion served as a unifying
element in the process of nation-building after times of occupation. While it is still the
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case in many Asian and African countries, in the past, European countries were also
uniformly religious and churches were closely bound with the political elite. The fiercest
wars between nations were and are on the question of which faith is the one true faith.
For Europe, the Northern Ireland conflict might be the most current example. Despite
ongoing modernization and secularization, many countries around the world still have
an established state religion. Even many of the rather secular Nordic countries still have
(or had until very recently) a Protestant state–church that is strongly integrated in public
life throughout traditional rituals and/or ceremonies. For cultural customs and traditions,
even in secular countries, it is quite common to include religious elements such as services
or hymn singing.
The strength and visibility of the connection between nation and religion or, to put
it differently, state and church, varies greatly across countries. Political rhetoric and
symbolism mainly achieve this visibility (Donahue 1975). While U.S. presidents from
Richard Nixon to Joe Biden ask God in official speeches to “Bless America”, other political
leaders show less emotional positive linking or even ensure careful avoidance of religious
symbolism, sometimes moving all the way to outright ideological rejection of any religion
in socialist or communist states.
Finally, what religious and national communities have in common is that they are
“imagined communities” (Anderson 1991, p. 6) in the sense that most of their members will
neither know, meet, or hear of each other. While religious communities are based on shared
belief, doctrine, rules, and tradition, which are more or less consistent across national
borders within denominations, national communities are to a large degree self-constructed
(Wright and Reeskens 2012). This means that there is no comprehensive consensus in
society on what “nation” actually means. To some extent, it might be used by individuals
to protect their own identities and values. The attachment towards country and fellow
citizens, which fuels national pride, therefore might partly be based on very individual
concepts of what the nation represents. Storm (2013) found in a qualitative British study
that while people with a strong religious identity tend to distinguish clearly between
their concepts of religion and nation, less religious and “religiously fuzzy” people tend
to include religious aspects into their concepts of nationality (Storm 2013, p. 35), thereby
strengthening patriotism.
This construction of nation by including religion presumably works much better in
religiously homogeneous societies in which there is little doubt that fellow citizens, if they
include religion in their self-concept of nation, follow the same religion.
On the basis of these theoretical considerations, the following section expounds the
theoretical basis of how the predictors moderate the relationship of atheism and national
pride and develops the hypotheses.
5. Predictors and Hypotheses
5.1. Individual Level
Age, Education, and Gender
Based on the findings of previous cross-national research, age, education, and gender
will be assessed as predictors for the analysis of atheism and national pride on the individ-
ual level. There is consensus that older people tend to be nationally prouder than younger
people (Smith and Kim 2006; Citrin and Sears 2009; Norris 2000; Inglehart 1997). A reason
may be that younger cohorts have been socialized in a more globalized context than older
cohorts and therefore might not rate national attachment that high.
If education is not impacted by national or religious ideology, it is supposed to increase
pupils’ ability for reflection which usually results in questioning national or religious
authorities. In social research, education has been shown to not always be a significant
predictor for national pride. If it is significant, however, the educated tend to be less proud
of their nation in most countries (Smith and Kim 2006; Citrin and Sears 2009).
Gender is a more ambiguous indicator. In some countries, men, and in other countries,
women have been found to show more national pride. Evans and Kelly’s explanation for
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this phenomenon is that men and women feel proud of different societal areas, such as men
for international sporting events and women for cultural treasures (Evans and Kelley 2002).
5.2. Country Level
5.2.1. Religious Pluralization
People tend to project their own religious values on their community (Wright and
Reeskens 2012), which by extension is the nation. For non-atheists, that should encourage
patriotism. This projection, however, is assumed to be more effective in denominationally
homogeneous societies because which religion otherwise holds the monopoly for this
projection remains in doubt. Consequently, in denominationally heterogeneous countries
with no common understanding that the nation carries religious attributes, atheists should
not feel any need to distance themselves from the nation only because they want to distance
themselves from religious ideas.
5.2.2. Church and State Relationship
The stronger the church and state relationship, the more intuitive the projection
of religious values on the nation state. Citizens do not necessarily know any law that
constitutes the church and state relationship, such as regulations on tax reduction for
a certain denomination, to form a clear perception of the church and state relationship.
Indicators such as positive portrayals by state-run radio and television or local and national
politicians asking God to “bless the country” are unmistakable indicators for a close church
and state relationship, which are visible for everyone. Then again, if there is a common
understanding that both spheres are intertwined, atheists may show a counter-reaction
against both and will appear less nationally proud.
5.2.3. General Level of Societal Religiosity
The level of societal religiosity has a great impact on shaping society in general.
Concerning individual feelings of national pride, it may serve as an amplifier for the
mechanisms described above. If the lack of religious pluralism discourages national pride
among atheists, this effect should become stronger the more religious the society. Moreover,
if the church and state relationship is close, atheists’ reflex of rejecting the comprehensive
intertwined package of religious and national ideas may also become stronger in more
religious countries. In both cases, atheists will appear less nationally proud the more
religious the society.
Following Durkheim’s idea of religion as “moral community” (Durkheim [1912]
2001), another factor for a high level of societal religiosity that decrease atheists’ national
pride is the social pressure exerted on atheists. In highly religious countries, churches’
social control of moral and social attitudes is strong. To be part of the community, people
need to follow the rules by adhering to the community’s religious beliefs and follow the
moral and social rules. Deviant behavior may be sanctioned by suspension from the
group, which in religious societies may have significant consequences not only for the
individual but for all family members. Facing such sanctions may provoke even stronger
counter-reactions and thereby increase the gap between atheists and non-atheists’ pride,
or as Siegers (2019, p. 497) puts it, “the differences between religious and non-religious
individuals should be less pronounced in less religious societies”, which here implies that
there is a more pronounced difference in the levels of national pride between atheists and
religious people in religious societies.10
5.2.4. Ideological Background
A country’s ideological background is a crucial factor for societal levels of religiosity
as well as individual religiosity. People who are socialized within a socialist or communist
regime, in which religion is suppressed by the state and anti-religious ideology is trans-
mitted through the school system, tend to stay distanced from religious ideas, provided
they do not receive any religious socialization from somewhere else. Atheists comply
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with the state ideology. Not being religious connects them with their fellow citizens. That
means atheism here fulfills the same role as religion in religious countries. Consequently,
in countries that currently have a socialist or communist regime, we would expect atheists
to show more national pride than religious people. The breakdown of a socialist regime
and a concomitant enactment of freedom of religion might make some people turn towards
religion; most, however, will not. Atheists in former socialist or communist countries that
remain secular have no reason to become less proud.
These considerations lead to the following hypotheses:
Hypothesis 1 (H1) (based on public assumption). Atheists tend to show less national pride
than religious people.
Hypothesis 2 (H2). A socialist or communist societal background, in which the past or prevalent
national ideology rejects religion, has a positive impact on atheists’ national pride.
Hypothesis 3 (H3). A close church–state relationship and low religious pluralization, combined
with a high level of societal religiosity, have a negative impact on atheists’ national pride.
6. Data, Measures, and Method
The data was generated using the ONBound Harmonization Wizard offered by the
ONBound project. This project provides a database that enables researchers to analyze
the interrelations of religious and national identities across a wide time span. For this
purpose, a vast array of existing individual-level and contextual data from this field was
collected. Following a guided selection process via the Harmonization Wizard, researchers
are able to construct a customized cumulated, harmonized, and merged data set according
to their specific analytical needs.11 My ONBound dataset (Bechert et al. 2020) is based upon
data from seventeen survey programs12 and two macro sources13 that contain the relevant
variables as described in the following paragraphs. It covers 99 countries, of which for 35
countries, all crucial micro and macro-level variables necessary for the Multilevel Analyses
are available and a considerable number of atheists could be observed. For the time span
analyzed, from 1981 to 2018, this selection yields almost three million respondents, of
whom almost 700,000 from 11 surveys answered a question on national pride.
How can atheists around the globe be identified in the data? In social surveys, respondents
are usually asked to choose between several given categories that describe religious orien-
tations (for a classification of categories, see Ischinsky and Bechert 2020) or, if there is no
suitable category, some surveys offer the option to give an open answer. In the customized
database, 16,336 respondents self-defined as atheists. Others may have wanted to do so
but did not have the option.
Based on the definition developed in Section 2, atheists are all “those, who do not be-
lieve in any god(s)”. For the analysis, this includes respondents who described themselves
as atheists in response to an open question or assigned themselves to a given “atheists”
category. Additionally, it includes those who reported not belonging to any denomination
AND answered at least one of the following belief items in the most strongly god-denying
way possible:14
1. Which of these statements comes closest to your beliefs? Answer: I don’t believe
in God.
2. How important is God in your life? Answer: Not important at all.
3. How would you describe yourself? Answer: Not religious at all.
The remaining respondents were assigned to two more comparative groups: the
“fuzzy” and the “religious”. Based on Voas’ concept of “fuzzy fidelity” (Voas 2009), those
who are moderately (non)-religious or inconsistent in their response behavior were cate-
gorized as fuzzy. This is also where the very small number of self-defined atheists who
showed signs of religiosity in one of the belief items ended up. The measure for the
“religious group” mirrors the atheists’ measure. Reporting to belong to any kind of de-
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nomination is the first prerequisite to be defined as religious. Respondents also must have
answered on one of the belief items listed above with the most extreme positively religious
answer (“I know God really exists and I have no doubts about it”, “Very important”,
“Extremely religious”). Those respondents offering no hint regarding the nature of their
religiosity in the data were excluded from the analyses.
The hypotheses imply that religious people who feel represented by their governments
tend to feel proud of their countries. A prerequisite for this assumption, however, is that the
religious individual belongs to the countries’ majority religion that is represented, if there
is such a thing as a clear majority religion. Therefore, for the analysis, all those who are
religious but belong to a minority religion in non-pluralistic countries have been excluded.
6.1. Individual-Level Indicators
The dependent variable on national pride is a harmonized four-point scale variable
including data from 62 survey waves15. All respondents were asked: “How proud are
you being [and then the respective nationality was entered, such as American, Swedish,
etc.]?” Response categories vary between “Very proud” and “Not proud at all”. Measuring
national pride is only distinct based on the responses of national citizens. Responses of
non-citizens cannot be interpreted clearly since they might not be proud of their country
of residence but of their home country. There is no way to clarify this retrospectively.
To exclude as many of these ambiguous responses as possible, all identifiable cases of
non-citizens were deleted.16
For control indicators, I will consider age, education, and gender. Age is a continuous
measure covering respondents from 14 to 123 years old. Education and gender are categor-
ical variables. Education is split into three categories: low, middle, and high education as
reference category. Gender is dichotomous, female being the reference category.
6.2. Time
The time aspect is handled very simplistically here as this paper does not contain
a trend hypothesis. As discussed later, these would be extremely heterogeneous across
countries. Societal value change does not happen suddenly. It is a slow process that should
become visible in the data with some time delay. The data suitable for analysis span the
years from 1981 to 2018. At first, I included them as four decade-dummies in the analysis.
After the subdivision showed no substantial information gain, I decided on bipartition into
“before 2000” and “after 2000”.
6.3. Country-Level Indicators
The three country-level indicators of church and state relationship (CHST), religious
pluralization (RDI), and the societal level of religiosity (GLOR) were combined in an
additive index.
Measuring something as complex as the relationship between church and state is not
an easy endeavor. As a basis for the measure, I am using an indicator provided by the
Religion and State Project that assigns countries’ state and church relationships on a scale
from 0 (specific hostility of state towards the church) to 13 (religion is mandatory for all),
based on several public as well as academic sources (Fox 2019). For the index, I rescaled this
indicator to range between 0 and 100. When the relationship changed during the time span
of my analysis, I weighted the value according to the number of years the church–state
arrangement was in place. Since I do not arrogate for myself as being able to do the country
coding, I did not implement any missing values for certain time periods. In that form, the
state and church relationship indicator is an admittedly rather crude measure representing
one third of the index, next to religious pluralization and societal religiosity.
The measure I created to capture religious pluralization is based on the logic of the
RDI (Religious Diversity Index), provided by the Pew Research Center (Liu 2014). The
original index calculates the religious diversity scores of societies based on percentages for
each denomination to which people in societies belong17, as taken from PEW research data.
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Index scores theoretically range between 0 and 10, in which the higher the score, the higher
the level of religious diversity in society. Considering the PEW RDI index is a snapshot
of the year 2010, I used data from the Religious Characteristics of States Dataset Project
that offers estimates of religious demographics by country for, in some cases, more than a
hundred years prior to 2015. For the measure I took the starting point of the analyses, 1981,
estimated average percentages over time per country and the denomination until 201518,
and calculated RDI values based on the PEW RDI formula. As a last step, the resulting
values were rescaled to range between 0 and 100.19
As an indicator for the general level of religiosity in society, I took the mean values per
country between 1981 and 2015 of the percentages of “non-religious people (of all kinds)”
indicated by the Religious Characteristics of States Dataset Project. These numbers give
at least a rough measurement for the level of secularization and thus, reversed, the level
of religiosity.
All three indicators provide country means across the whole timespan. They vary
between 0 and 100, wherein 0 theoretically indicates mandatory religion for all, zero
religious pluralization, and a zero percentage of non-religious people in society.20
Whether or not a country has a socialist or communist background21 was coded
based on comprehensive research considering various sources analyzing historic and
contemporary state ideologies and policies. The dichotomous measure indicates a socialistic
background if there is/was a period of practically a one-party socialistic regime any time
since 1881 (a hundred years before the collection of the first data). For countries indicated
as having no socialist background, this makes it impossible that a respondent in the data
had directly been socialized within a socialist regime; at least, not in the country in which
the individual took the survey22,23.
6.4. Methods
The empirical analyses start descriptively and lead into the Multilevel Analysis in the
process of answering my research questions. To examine H2 and H3, Multilevel Analysis
is the method of choice because it allows to examine relationships between indicators on
different hierarchical levels. The model in this paper contains two levels: an individual
and a country level. Individuals are clustered in countries. Considering that in this study
I focus on cross-sectional aspects, the time factor is included as control variable and not
as a separate hierarchical dimension. The interaction effects for socialist background and
atheism on national pride, and the CHST_RDI_GLOR index and atheism on national
pride are calculated in separate models considering that naturally a socialist regime and a
positive state and church relationship are exclusive.
The first questions to answer, however, focus on the research subjects, the atheists24.
7. Results
Where are the atheists? Across the 35 countries within the time period analyzed, al-
together 132,539 atheists were identified within the ONBound data. Figure 1 shows the
number of atheists per country and the respective percentage per sample. The least num-
ber of atheists found were in the US, while the most atheists appear in Germany25. The
percentages of atheists per country/sample puts these numbers in the correct relation to
the sample size.26
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among men than women and for 33 of the 35 countries in the mean, they are younger than 
non-atheists. Additionally, they are more highly educated than their fellow citizens in 34 
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What do people29 think about atheists? Section 2 offered an overview of literature on 
attitudes towards atheists, mainly based on U.S. American studies. I am using the cumu-
lated ONBound data to look at other countries. The International Social Survey Progamme 
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Figure 1. ONBound atheists in percentage of the 35 country samples across all surveys and years.
Proportionally, Vietnam indicates the most atheists, followed by China and the Czech
Republic. It is notable, albeit not very surprising, that the four countries with the highest
proportion of atheists can be found in countries with a socialistic imprint. It is also
unsurprising that highly religious countries such as Mexico, Brazil, and Italy are among
the countries with the lowest number of atheists.27
Who are the atheists? Atheists’ demographic characteristics from the ONBound data
confirm results from previous research. In all countries, the proportion of atheists is higher
among men than women and for 33 of the 35 countries in the mean, they are younger than
non-atheists. Additionally, they are more highly educated than their fellow citizens in 34 of
the 35 countries.28
What do people29 think about atheists? Section 2 offered an overview of literature on atti-
tudes towards atheists, mainly based on U.S. American studies. I am using the cumulated
ONBound data to look at other countries. The International Social Survey Progamme of
2008 and 2018 (ISSP Research Group 2018; ISSP Research Group 202030) asks generally
about attitudes towards atheists: “What is your personal attitude towards atheists or
non-believers?” Across 20 countries in 2008, the average percentage of those who answered
(somewhat or very) negative was 20%; however, there were big differences between coun-
tries. While in countries such as France, the Netherlands, and Russia, this percentage
remains below 7%, in Turkey it is 60%, and in the Philippines even 68%. Compared to 2008,
in 2018 (across 33 countries) in most countries participating in both surveys, respondents
appeared slightly more tolerant towards atheists. Now, the country average is at 17%.
Yet, it is still the same countries in which positive attitudes prevail and in which negative
attitudes prevail. At 26%, the US also displays slightly above-average negative attitudes
towards atheists but is by no means an outlier.
Sounding out a bit more of the political direction, some surveys31 ask respondents
whether they agree or disagree that “politicians who do not believe in God are unfit for
public office”. Here, as well, opinions vary greatly across countries. While in Andorra,
Sweden, Denmark, Norway, and the Netherlands, (strong) agreement does not exceed 5%,
it is above 80% in Georgia, Indonesia, Iraq, Nigeria, Pakistan, and Egypt. The average
(strong) agreement across the 91 countries this variable is available for is 37%. At 34%, the
US comes fairly close to this average.
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Another item32 implicitly reveals respondents’ opinions on how well atheism and
patriotism go together. Respondents were asked how important they think religion is
“for being truly [NATIONALITY]”. Of the 57 countries the variable provides data for, on
average 47% answered religion to be very or at least fairly important. Again, variation
between countries is pronounced. While in China only 10%, in the Netherlands 11%, and
Sweden 15% answered that way, support is almost comprehensive in societies such as the
Philippines (88%), Turkey (89%), and Thailand (97%). Again, the US comes in a bit above
average with 54% of responses for very or fairly important.
A question asked by the Arab Barometer (Jamal et al. n.d.)33 comes closest to my
research question, as it concretely asks respondents in ten countries whether they agree or
disagree that religious or denominational differences should NOT be a reason for doubting
patriotism. Across all Arabic countries that took part in the survey, most people show
tolerance and (strongly) agree. On average, only 13% (strongly) disagree. The question
remains whether respondents involve atheists in “denominational differences”.
The data shows a similar heterogeneity between countries in terms of the presence of
professing atheists and attitudes towards the very same. Not surprisingly, but now proved
with numbers, in religious countries there are less atheists and attitudes towards them
appear significantly more negative. The US might be an outlier for the Western World, by
showing comparably negative attitudes. But they are by no means exceptional across the
word. Considering the US is actually an exceptionally religious country in the Western
world, this suggests that the level of religiosity is most important for negative attitudes
towards atheists and the US is only such a prominent example because the topic is so hotly
discussed and so many studies are conducted addressing this topic.
So, are they less proud than the rest of the society and especially religious people? Figure 2
gives a provisional descriptive answer to that question formulated also as H2.
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Figure 2. Mean national pride of atheists and religious people, numbers in Table A1 (Appendix A).
In most countries, atheists do indeed appear less proud than non-atheists. However,
this descriptive analysis shows sig ificant differences in the size of these gaps across
countries. In countrie having a soci list background, national pride mong atheists
seems to be mor common than mong atheists in countries without such background. To
investigate these rel tions i more depth, the next step is a Multilevel Analysis. Table 1
presents the model results.
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Table 1. Multilevel Analysis results.
Model M0 SE M1 SE M2a SE M2b SE M3a SE M3b SE




Country 0.061 0.015 0.042 0.010 0.042 0.010 0.043 0.011 0.041 0.010 0.041 0.010
Fixed Effects Gender (male)34 0.004 0.005 0.004 0.005 0.004 0.005 0.004 0.005 0.005 0.005
Coeficients Age 0.003 0.000 0.003 0.000 0.003 0.000 0.003 0.000 0.003 0.000
Education35
Low education 0.089 0.006 0.088 0.006 0.087 0.006 0.088 0.006 0.088 0.006
Mid. education 0.074 0.006 0.073 0.006 0.073 0.006 0.074 0.005 0.072 0.006
Religious Type36
Atheist −0.233 0.009 −0.231 0.009 −0.260 0.010 −0.231 0.009 −0.437 0.023
Religious 0.073 0.005 0.074 0.006 0.072 0.006 0.074 0.006 0.119 0.014
Time (after 2000)37 0.065 0.007 0.065 0.007 0.065 0.007 0.065 0.007
Ideological background
(socialist) −0.003 0.072 0.066 0.075








Note: N = 130,720; cell entries are unstandardized regression coefficients. Not significant (p > 0.1) coefficients are indicated in grey. All
significant coefficients are p < 0.01.
Model 0 is a null model without any covariates. It provides information on the
variance. The total variance40 is 0.58 and the Intra-class correlation coefficient41 is 0.11. This
indicates that 11% of the variance can be attributed to differences between countries,
while 89% of the variance is between respondents. This variance partition gives a good
justification for conducting a Multilevel Analysis.
Model 1 reports the fixed effects of all individual-level variables, the control variables
of gender, age, and education, as well as the core variable indicating the religious type,
i.e., being religious, fuzzy (reference), or atheist. While the coefficient for gender is not
statistically significant, the results for age and education confirm previous research. Older
people tend to be prouder than younger people and the less educated tend to be prouder
than the better educated. The effects, however, are not very strong. The coefficients for the
religious type confirm H1 and the results of the descriptive analyses: when controlled for
age, gender, and education, atheists remain significantly less proud of their countries than
religiously fuzzy and religious people.
Model 2a is the first of two country-level main effect models. Beyond the individual-
level indicators, it includes the macro-level variables of time and socialistic background. It
was revealed that only the time aspect proved statistically significant. People in the two
decades after 2000 were generally a bit prouder than in the two decades before 2000.
Model 2b includes the interaction effect of socialist background and religious type. The
presence of this interaction effect (1) implies that the effect of socialist background depends
on the religious type. The interaction term of “Atheist*Soc. Background” represents the
changes in the effect of socialist background of atheists toward the fuzzy group, with
an estimate of 0.1339. These results confirm H2: a country’s socialist background, has a
positive impact on atheists’ national pride.
Models 3a and 3b address the index combining church and state relationship, religious
pluralization, and societal religiosity. While the main effect model (3a) shows no statistically
significant direct effect of the index on national pride, model 3b shows that there is an
interaction effect (interaction effect 2). Compared to those being religiously fuzzy, a loose
church and state relationship, combined with a high level of religious pluralization and
low general societal religiosity, has a statistically significant and positive effect, even if
not very strong, on atheists’ national pride. To put it the other way around, a strong and
positive church and state relationship within a religiously homogeneous and generally
religious society has a negative impact on atheists’ national pride, and thereby model 3b
confirms H3.
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8. Discussion
The first thing to keep in mind when interpreting the results above is that the analyses
are all based on a large, harmonized dataset combining data across several survey programs
and covering over four decades. This dataset provides an exceptionally large sample size.
Harmonization, however, always comes at the cost of detail, such as the concrete wording
of the question across variables or mode effects across surveys (Granda et al. 2010).
Second, the analysis shows trends across 35 countries that are in many respects
diverse. It is hardly possible that measuring instruments work equally well for so many
different countries over four decades. Using them must be considered the trade-off between
accepting a certain degree of inaccuracy in favor of the possibility to compare (on cross-
national (in)-comparability of measurement instruments, see e.g., Bechert 2018). The
categorization of countries’ ideological background over time contains some degree of
inaccuracy. For countries such as China that follow the same state ideology throughout
the whole timespan, data is available and the indicator works perfectly well. However, in
most countries analyzed in this paper and coded as “with socialist background”, socialism
ended at the end of the 1980s with the collapse of the Soviet regime. One consequence
was the cessation of the state suppression of religion. Societies reacted differently to this
release. While some societies such as Estonia remained almost uniformly unreligious, in
other countries such as Croatia and Russia, the literature even speaks of a post-socialist
religious revival (Köllner 2020, p. 122); public affiliation with religion and the church
increased, as well as the churches’ influence on various areas of society increased, from the
education system to the military (Knorre and Zygmont 2020). It is difficult to disentangle
which age cohort in which country was socialized under anti-religious ideology and might
therefore have stayed atheistic in the new regime, which, depending on the church–state
relationship of the new regime, might encourage national pride or the counter-reaction.
Younger generations were not socialized under a religion-oppressing regime. However,
they might still be shaped by a secular society. It is individually different which influence is
and was the strongest and what this means for the actual feelings towards the country and
people. By indicating a country’s socialistic background, I could only indicate long years of
anti-religious influence, which analyses have proven to have an impact people’s national
pride. Disentangling all these factors for each country may be a difficult but worthwhile
analytical approach to get more profound results for the mediation effects of atheism and
societal ideological background on national pride.
A comparably clear example provides the case of Germany, in which about one third of
the population lived under a socialistic regime from 1945 to 1990 in the German Democratic
Republic. Now united, the country legally has a separation of church and state by federal
law. Apart from a few cases concerning the then divided Berlin, respondents could be
assigned according to the ideological background of the part of Germany they lived in at the
time the survey was conducted. For the vast majority of respondents, that is also the part
of Germany where they grew up. Table 2 shows country-specific effects of atheism and a
country’s ideological background on national pride in Germany. The picture that results in
the single-country simple regression is even clearer than that for the Multilevel Analysis.
The age effect is identical with the multilevel model. However, in line with the theory,
men tend to be significantly prouder than women. In addition, the negative effect of
education on national pride is much stronger in the reduced model. There is a strong and
statistically significant negative effect of atheism on national pride and a positive effect of
religiousness. Notably, while the main effect of the ideological background is statistically
insignificant, the interaction effect of atheism and socialistic background on national pride
is very convincing. Atheists who were socialized in Eastern Germany tend to feel more
national pride than atheists socialized in Western Germany.
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Table 2. Regression Analysis for the German sample.
B SE
Gender (male) I −0.155 0.031
Age 0.003 0.001
Education
Low education 0.293 0.047
Mid. education 0.283 0.033
Religious Type
Atheist −0.331 0.046
Religious 0.106 ** 0.041
Ideological background (socialist) −0.114 0.071
Interaction effect 1
Atheist*Soc_background 0.476 0.093
I Reference category: female. Note 1: There is no coefficient for time because the variation of pride across decades
for Germany is too small to be captured by the regression analysis. Note 2: N = 3314; R2 = 0.57; dependent
variable: national pride; grey cells = estimate not statistically significant, ** Religious p < 0.050; the interaction
term of Religious*Soc_background is not significant.
Regarding pride, there may also be some national specific factors interacting in the
cross-national analysis. In some countries, strong identification with the region encourages
regional pride at the expense of pride towards the nation. Examples include Catalonia and
the Basque Country in Spain or Scotland in Great Britain, in which even separation from
the main country is openly discussed.
Another national specific example in which pride patterns deviate from other countries
is, again, Germany, showing particularly low levels of national pride. In the case of
Germany, this is rooted in a “guilt-effect” which took hold after World War II that prevents
especially older German cohorts from feeling proud of a country and a people responsible
for committing atrocities such as the Holocaust. To this day, many Germans associate the
expression of national pride with right-wing ideas (Meitinger 2018), creating a pride-barrier.
U.S. survey data will show during the next months whether the “Proud Boys” storming
the Capitol in Washington might trigger a probably much weaker but similarly structured
effect in the US. I would not be overly surprised if we witnessed a decrease in expressed
national pride among the many who despise this action.
Another issue that challenges the cross-national analysis is that there is good reason
to believe that also atheism has country-specific characteristics. In Section 2 I discussed
the different characteristics of atheism that result from being socialized in religious or
secular countries. However, the countries’ dominant religion or denomination might also
make a difference, even if the individual does not believe in it. Demerath (2000) coined the
term “cultural religion” in order to capture the remaining attachment among individuals
to a particular religion that is nationally and historically important for society, combined
with the attachment to the respective community, without compelling active belief. This
concept goes beyond Davie’s concept of “belonging without believing” (discussed in
Section 2) by not including nominal belonging to a church. Cultural religion implies the
“shaping of personal identity” by the impact of religious traditions without partaking in
its beliefs or rituals (Demerath 2000, pp. 127, 136). Individuals shaped in this way may
therefore be called (or even already call themselves) cultural Catholics, cultural Protestants,
cultural Jews, etc. Demerath even claims that perhaps “the most fundamental distinction
in Northern Ireland is between cultural Catholics and cultural Protestants” (Demerath
2000, p. 131). From cultural religion it is only a small step to what could be described as
“religiously coined atheism”, in which there is zero belief but still attachment, as Demerath
(2000, p. 131) quotes a Northern Irish person saying: “Even when you are an atheist, you
are either a Catholic or a Protestant atheist.”42
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9. Conclusions and Outlook
This article explores the nature of prejudices against atheists and atheists’ national
pride cross-nationally. It contributes to the large research field of “how religion moderates
individual values” by occupying a hitherto under-studied niche of “how non-religion
moderates individual values” and assesses which societal-level factors interact with this
relationship.
Can atheists be regarded as patriots? was the trigger question for this article. Based on
the available data, it was not possible to determine whether atheists around the globe are
regarded as patriots in their countries. What did become clear is that negative attitudes
towards atheists, the perception that religion is a crucial element for citizenship, and the
perspective that “the right” religion is a prerequisite for public office is by no means an
exclusively American phenomenon. Furthermore, these attitudes correlate highly with
the general societal level of religiosity and thereby with the presence of active and passive
atheists in society. My second endeavor was to investigate whether atheists around the
globe actually are less proud of their countries. The answer is, “yes, they are”. That means
that the publicly shared assumption that atheists tend to feel less national pride cannot be
dismissed. However, first, the extent of the difference between the levels of national pride
among atheists compared to non-atheists by no means justifies the pronounced prejudices
that could be observed in some countries. Second, the analyses show that regarding a lack
of belief in God as the decisive reason for missing national pride is too short-sighted.
Through exploring the question of why atheists tend to be less nationally proud, I
found that societal-level factors, such as the country’s ideological background in particular
and the general level of societal religiosity, the countries’ relationship of church and state,
and the level of religious pluralization interact with atheists’ feelings of national pride.
What this paper thereby demonstrates is that even atheists cannot escape the influence of
religion; they might in terms of individual contacts, but hardly on the indirect, societal
level. The more religious the society, the stronger the impact.
Although, harmonization might have blurred some survey effects and no one-hundred
percent accurate predictors are directly available given the very different historical de-
velopments in countries during the last decades, the Multilevel Analysis based on large
sample sizes shows clear trends. Indicators can be more finely calibrated now for indi-
vidual countries to gain individual country insights on the interdependencies. Another
worthwhile follow-up analysis would be to explore the predictors of prejudices against
atheists. Although my analyses remain on the descriptive level, the assumption is obvious
that the same societal-level indicators play crucial roles here. Finally, while atheists proved
to have very similar demographic characteristics across countries, what being an atheist
means with respect to different religions remains largely unexplored. For future research
on atheism’s impact on values, possible differences caused by the formative effect of the
societies’ dominant religions should be considered.
The essential question for the interpretation of the relationship between (non)-religiosity
and national pride is: what does a lack of national pride mean for society? Does it mean
a lack of loyalty towards the community, as some assume? The “Proud Boys” involved
in the storming of the U.S. Capitol on that January day, to the dismay of the majority of
the society, may have been loyal to their president but demonstrated that the “national
community” is a matter of subjective perception.
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Appendix A
Table A1. Surveys and respondents across countries and years (1981–2018), number and percentage (by survey) of
respondents who answered the national pride item.
Surveys N National Pride (n) National Pride (%)
AmericasBarometer (AmericasB) 31,388 26,568 3.8
Asia Europe Survey (ASES) 11,214 10,768 1.6
AsiaBarometer Survey (AsiaB) 16,378 16,145 2.3
Asian Barometer Survey (AsianB) 48,157 37,478 5.4
Candidate Countries Eurobarometer (CCEB) 44,650 19,514 2.8
Eurobarometer (EB) 1,477,847 173,785 25.1
European Values Study (EVS) 136,451 127,115 18.4
International Social Survey Programme (ISSP) 332,302 56,926 8.2
Latinobarometro (LatinoB) 151,496 83,196 12.0
Pew Global Attitudes Survey (PewGAP) 188,984 12,628 1.8
World Values Survey (WVS) 135,096 127,434 18.4
Total 2,573,963 691,557 100.0
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ARGENTINA 39,716 2.43 1082 3 2.18 10,805 27 2.53 14,550 37 2.43 5 11
AUSTRALIA 32,000 2.67 1520 5 2.72 3238 10 2.89 2703 8 2.77 16 30
AUSTRIA 109,283 2.38 2194 2 2.16 7632 7 2.58 7336 7 2.46 11 22
BRAZIL 48,452 2.38 358 1 2.27 21,255 44 2.48 11,233 23 2.31 6 15
CHILE 44,203 2.45 530 1 2.06 10447 24 2.50 13,201 30 2.40 8 13
CHINA 68,275 2.30 8578 13 2.35 1870 3 2.33 5790 8 2.37 48 52
CROATIA 57,868 2.33 674 1 1.41 4758 8 2.46 2356 4 2.08 5 9
CZECH REPUBLIC 112,934 2.08 13,259 12 2.18 3949 3 2.29 8245 7 2.19 42 36
DENMARK 148,495 2.33 3486 2 2.09 6250 4 2.41 11,323 8 2.43 8 17
ESTONIA 91,133 2.02 6880 8 2.39 2927 3 2.34 7019 8 2.42 52 38
FINLAND 117,410 2.47 2797 2 2.44 7363 6 2.75 8368 7 2.66 13 19
FRANCE 171,833 2.20 8301 5 2.25 10,341 6 2.40 12,048 7 2.35 20 36
GERMANY 285,865 1.81 14,363 5 1.78 18,133 6 2.07 18,386 6 1.89 23 34
HONG KONG 7336 1.94 333 5 1.77 409 6 2.13 778 11 1.89 19 53
HUNGARY 107,153 2.39 4274 4 2.11 7409 7 2.54 7894 7 2.33 10 17
ICELAND 24,115 2.52 804 3 2.16 1694 7 2.71 3126 13 2.55 2 5
ITALY 153,516 2.25 1596 1 1.90 12,521 8 2.36 5942 4 2.22 15 24
JAPAN 39,789 2.08 2805 7 2.12 3540 9 2.47 7360 18 2.21 13 46
KOREA, REPUBLIC OF
SOUTH 30,073 2.07 2676 9 1.85 4092 14 2.10 4498 15 2.01 1 43
MEXICO 57,233 2.56 561 1 2.20 21,126 37 2.60 13,708 24 2.47 4 8
MONGOLIA 5593 2.76 562 10 2.77 2161 39 2.78 1242 22 2.75 29 42
NETHERLANDS 159,350 2.08 7474 5 2.03 9611 6 2.23 11,217 7 2.19 37 41
NORWAY 50,910 2.37 4182 8 2.43 6030 12 2.70 10,037 20 2.65 5 10
RUSSIAN
FEDERATION 103,328 2.12 5590 5 2.09 13046 13 2.45 11877 11 2.34 33 47
SINGAPORE 9379 2.37 245 3 2.27 2134 23 2.42 1730 18 2.34 15 62
SLOVAKIA 97,673 2.19 2462 3 2.15 10,020 10 2.36 4885 5 2.23 12 19
SLOVENIA 100,314 2.53 3723 4 2.47 6152 6 2.70 8191 8 2.44 10 17
SPAIN 205,673 2.35 7006 3 1.83 21,559 10 2.51 26,302 13 2.35 17 25
SWEDEN 121,430 2.28 7712 6 2.36 3990 3 2.49 10,741 9 2.49 29 37
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SWITZERLAND 36,278 2.23 2963 8 2.05 8496 23 2.43 10,163 28 2.33 12 22
TAIWAN 23,021 2.05 420 2 2.00 3026 13 2.20 3871 17 2.04 4 41
UNITED KINGDOM 219,644 2.39 8275 4 2.18 14,596 7 2.46 12755 6 2.39 17 31
UNITED STATES 47,115 2.66 1046 2 2.47 13,111 28 2.83 3041 6 2.61 12 27
URUGUAY 37,451 2.57 2292 6 2.41 6407 17 2.65 12,126 32 2.56 39 39
VIET NAM 11,465 2.79 1516 13 2.74 1507 13 2.86 3336 29 2.81 19 60
Table A3. Atheists’ demographics.
Gender (% Male) Age (Mean) Education (% Low) Education (% High)







ARGENTINA 46.7 67.8 47.3 43.1 37.1 42.9 53.2 34.0 52.8 20.5 39.9 20.9
AUSTRALIA 47.5 57.4 48.0 49.5 47.2 49.4 35.6 29.3 35.4 28.3 33.4 28.4
AUSTRIA 44.5 58.4 45.2 46.5 41.6 46.2 49.0 19.5 47.2 10.8 19.4 11.3
BRAZIL 46.9 71.5 47.0 39.7 36.5 39.6 64.2 57.0 64.2 12.6 25.6 12.6
CHILE 44.1 70.0 44.4 43.4 36.6 43.4 42.8 24.1 42.7 19.2 36.5 19.3
CHINA 48.8 52.4 49.4 42.6 40.5 42.2 49.3 47.9 49.3 13.0 24.8 13.4
CROATIA 43.6 60.3 44.1 45.0 47.2 45.0 30.0 12.5 29.6 16.3 30.8 16.7
CZECH REPUBLIC 44.1 52.8 46.0 47.5 44.4 46.9 30.5 16.8 27.5 12.1 11.2 11.9
DENMARK 48.9 61.8 49.6 46.9 43.4 46.7 21.1 20.6 21.1 33.1 35.3 33.4
ESTONIA 38.5 52.4 40.7 47.7 45.7 47.3 25.1 23.6 24.8 22.5 22.3 22.5
FINLAND 45.6 63.8 46.8 48.8 42.2 48.4 30.8 19.7 29.9 24.9 31.4 25.5
FRANCE 47.1 53.2 47.7 47.4 44.5 47.1 39.1 23.6 36.8 26.3 24.1 26.0
GERMANY 47.9 56.6 48.7 47.3 46.1 47.2 42.9 25.1 40.1 19.0 20.9 19.3
HONG KONG 45.2 52.9 45.5 46.3 42.4 46.1 45.6 48.2 45.7 19.4 15.4 19.2
HUNGARY 41.9 54.5 42.8 48.8 42.1 48.3 44.1 20.0 42.3 12.8 17.3 13.1
ICELAND 46.8 62.0 47.8 46.3 36.5 45.6 30.7 26.4 30.4 36.4 39.4 36.6
ITALY 46.4 62.9 46.8 44.7 42.5 44.6 46.3 30.2 45.7 14.4 20.6 14.6
JAPAN 47.0 53.5 47.5 50.5 43.7 50.0 20.5 14.1 20.2 22.8 32.4 23.3
KOREA, REPUBLIC
OF SOUTH 47.9 59.9 49.1 42.6 40.2 42.4 17.1 14.0 16.8 37.5 38.0 37.5
MEXICO 48.6 60.2 48.7 38.7 33.9 38.6 52.8 47.6 52.8 18.2 29.0 18.3
MONGOLIA 44.0 51.2 44.7 40.3 37.5 39.9 28.9 21.4 28.2 33.9 33.1 33.8
NETHERLANDS 46.0 54.7 46.9 47.1 45.6 46.9 46.7 34.7 44.6 22.9 31.2 24.4
NORWAY 49.4 61.9 50.5 45.7 40.8 45.2 29.1 16.0 27.6 32.7 39.3 33.5
RUSSIAN
FEDERATION 39.5 61.1 41.4 45.2 42.5 45.0 21.0 19.1 20.8 26.2 26.7 26.3
SINGAPORE 47.4 55.1 47.6 40.3 41.1 40.3 39.2 24.1 38.8 22.0 28.6 22.1
SLOVAKIA 41.9 58.9 42.7 46.0 42.7 45.9 36.0 13.5 35.1 12.0 19.1 12.3
SLOVENIA 44.7 53.6 45.3 45.9 44.9 45.9 37.4 14.7 36.0 14.2 24.9 14.9
SPAIN 46.8 60.8 47.6 46.3 39.0 45.9 56.9 40.6 55.8 18.5 25.9 19.0
SWEDEN 47.5 59.4 49.4 49.3 44.7 48.6 38.8 19.6 36.2 30.5 25.8 29.9
SWITZERLAND 46.1 58.0 47.1 49.0 41.9 48.4 31.4 17.8 30.3 19.8 28.3 20.5
TAIWAN 50.5 57.9 50.6 45.1 40.7 45.0 34.2 29.4 34.1 27.9 42.5 28.1
UNITED
KINGDOM 45.0 55.3 45.8 47.8 44.6 47.5 52.1 35.8 50.3 20.5 27.3 21.3
UNITED STATES 45.8 65.6 46.3 47.6 44.2 47.5 17.8 10.5 17.8 29.8 41.3 29.9
URUGUAY 44.1 60.5 45.2 46.1 41.2 45.8 68.3 57.0 67.6 15.6 25.7 16.2
VIET NAM 48.8 57.5 50.0 39.6 36.7 39.2 48.1 27.6 44.9 13.8 23.2 15.3




(Agree + Strongly Agree in %)
ONBound Variable:
Natid_bound5a




(Disagree + Strongly Disagree in %)
ALBANIA 39 16 -
ALGERIA 78 - 11
ANDORRA 3 - -
ARGENTINA 35 29 -
ARMENIA 54 55 -
AUSTRALIA 13 34 -
AUSTRIA 17 45 -
AZERBAIJAN - 33 -





(Agree + Strongly Agree in %)
ONBound Variable:
Natid_bound5a




(Disagree + Strongly Disagree in %)
BANGLADESH 71 - -
BELARUS 29 47 -
BELGIUM 7 24 -
BOSNIA AND HERZEGOVINA 29 - -
BRAZIL 49 - -
BULGARIA 29 73 -
BURKINA FASO 49 - -
CANADA 18 33 -
CHILE 32 52 -
CHINA - 10 -
CROATIA 26 53 -
CYPRUS 38 - -
CYPRUS without Northern Cyprus 48 - -
CZECH REPUBLIC 8 30 -
DENMARK 3 26 -
EGYPT 88 - 11
ESTONIA 15 26 -
ETHIOPIA 49 - -
FINLAND 11 24 -
FRANCE 9 19 -
GEORGIA 82 68 -
GERMANY 12 31 -
GHANA 73 - -
GREECE 37 76 -
GUATEMALA 59 - -
HUNGARY 15 47 -
ICELAND 8 23 -
INDIA 45 60 -
INDONESIA 88 95 -
IRAN (ISLAMIC REPUBLIC OF) 75 - -
IRAQ 87 - 4
IRELAND 18 49 -
ISRAEL 16 68 -
ITALY 15 58 -
JAPAN 8 24 -
JORDAN 75 - 11
KOREA, REPUBLIC OF (SOUTH) 13 44 -
KOSOVO 60 - -
KYRGYZSTAN 36 - -
LATVIA 20 27 -
LEBANON - - 10
LITHUANIA 20 65 -
LUXEMBOURG 12 - -
MACEDONIA, THE FORMER
YUGOSLAV REPUBLIC OF 33 - -
MALAYSIA 64 61 -
MALI 59 - -
MALTA 42 - -
MEXICO 33 57 -
MOLDOVA, REPUBLIC OF 44 - -
MONTENEGRO 30 - -
MOROCCO 73 - -
NETHERLANDS 4 11 -
NEW ZEALAND 10 34 -
NIGERIA 82 - -
NORTHERN CYPRUS 33 - -
NORWAY 5 19 -
PAKISTAN 95 - -
PALESTINIAN TERRITORY - - 22
PERU 39 - -
PHILIPPINES 68 88 -
POLAND 16 63 -
PORTUGAL 15 54 -
PUERTO RICO 65 - -
ROMANIA 49 78 -
RUSSIAN FEDERATION 21 53 -
RWANDA 44 - -
SAUDI ARABIA - - 25
SERBIA 36 63 -
SERBIA without Kosovo after 2008 83 - -
SLOVAKIA 17 49 -
SLOVENIA 10 30 -
SOUTH AFRICA 49 79 -
SPAIN 12 37 -
SUDAN, THE REPUBLIC OF THE - - 12
SWEDEN 4 15 -





(Agree + Strongly Agree in %)
ONBound Variable:
Natid_bound5a




(Disagree + Strongly Disagree in %)
SWITZERLAND 13 28 -
TAIWAN 10 26 -
TANZANIA, UNITED REPUBLIC
OF 66 - -
THAILAND 64 97 -
TRINIDAD AND TOBAGO 68 - -
TUNISIA - - 15
TURKEY 61 89 -
UGANDA 63 - -
UKRAINE 39 - -
UNITED KINGDOM 14 32 -
UNITED STATES 33 54 -
URUGUAY 13 29 -
VENEZUELA 52 71 -
VIET NAM 18 - -
YEMEN, REPUBLiC OF - - 15
ZAMBIA 55 - -
ZIMBABWE 54 - -
Notes
1 Utilizing the term “atheists” for the research subjects in this paper is quite controversial, given that the term is strongly
ideologically occupied. Public debates show that everyone seems to have an idea for atheism at handonly that these ideas are as
heterogeneous as are individual beliefs. Thus, I decided to keep the term “atheists” anyway for two reasons: first, this is what
the American public debate is about: atheists’ feelings about their country and people and, second, atheism is what describes
non-belief most precisely. To avoid any misunderstanding, I dedicated the first section of this paper to a profound definition.
2 The statement made in an interview with the journalist Robert I. Sherman on 27 August 1987 was printed by several sources. The
background is explained here: https://www.secularism.org.uk/33034.html (accessed on 1 May 2020).
3 For more information on the project and the link to the ONBound Harmonization Wizard see https://www.gesis.org/en/
services/processing-and-analyzing-data/data-harmonization/onbound (accessed on 1 January 2020).
4 For a political–theoretical assessment of the “New Atheism” movement, see Roseneck (2021) in this special issue.
5 This does not mean that no attempt for a conceptualization was ever made. For an overview, see Zuckerman (2012, p. 8).
6 All classifications I am aware of only cover monotheistic religions.
7 One might wonder why I chose atheists and not agnostics as research subjects. Following Richard Dawkins’ argumentation,
agnosticism is an ambiguous concept. Agnostics do not believe in god(s), which is what makes them atheists. If there was proof
that god(s) exist, agnostics would become believers and so would atheists (Dawkins 2006, p. 69).
8 A Google search gives approximately 1,920,000,000 hits for this phrase.
9 See on the issue of the inseperability of patriotism and nationalism also the introduction of this volume.
10 The competing argument here would be the “religious defence” thesis, assuming larger differences between religious and non-
religious people in secular societies, as being religious in secular societies requires more individual effort (see Siegers 2019, p. 498f).
11 For more information on the technical processes, see May et al. (2020). Detailed documentation on the individual and country-
level data provide ONBound (2020a, 2020b, 2020c).
12 See Table A1.
13 The Religious Characteristics of States Dataset (Brown and James 2019) and data from the Religion and State Project (Fox 2019).
14 It is “at least one question” because not all three questions are available for each respondent. However, there is no reason to
believe that a religious person would respond to any of the three qustions in the most god-denying way possible. Since the
variables are harmonized by the OnBound project, there is no unique question text. For the references to the original questions,
please see the ONBound (2020b).
15 See ONBound (2020b) for more details.
16 Citizenship information is available for about 50% of cases but differs significantly across countries. The average non-citizen rate
among those who answered for national pride, however, is 1%. Consequently, on average, there is probably 1% of unidentified
non-citizens left in the data. Since it is predominantly the nationally very homogeneous countries such as Vietnam or China in
which citizenship was not asked, or countries where the sample was drawn from a register based on citizenship, the non-citizen
rate presumably is even lower. Either way, these represent less than 1% and should have little impact on the results.
17 For the detailed methodology, see https://www.pewforum.org/2014/04/04/methodology-2/ (accessed on 1 August 2020).
18 Only very few survey data entries go beyond that point of time.
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19 The correlation of the original RDI provided by PEW and my measure covering almost four decades is 0.902.
20 Pairwise correlations for the three components: self-constructed RDI/CHST = 0.522; self-constructed RDI/GLOR = 747; and
GLOR/CHST = 0.386. Chrombach’s Alpha for the index = 0.733.
21 From here on I will shorten the phrase as “socialistic background” for space reasons.
22 The decision was made to code Germany as non-socialistic considering most respondents were socialized in West Germany.
23 An overview on values for all macro indicators per country is found in Table A2.
24 For the reasons stated above, no distinction can be made between active and passive atheists.
25 The rather high number of atheists in Germany are the result of, first, a high density of social surveys in Germany for the whole
time period and, second, a systematic oversampling of the eastern part of Germany after 1989. If statements are made on the
representativity of the whole German population, these data are weighted down according to the East–West population size.
26 See also column 4 and 5 in Table A2.
27 To check for representativeness, the percentage of atheists in society were compared with RCS data (2019) based on official
statistics. The standard deviation across countries is 2.4, which is rather small. The largest deviations are for South Korea (0%
atheists according to RCS-9% ONBound), Vietnam (6% RCS–13% ONB), Estonia (15% RCS–8% ONB), Russia (11%–5% ONB),
and Sweden (11% RCS–6% ONB).
28 See Table A3 for demographic information on atheists across 35 countries.
29 People in this respect means respondents to the following surveys, which includes atheists and non-atheists as they appear in
societies.
30 For comprehensive distributions on the variables, see (GESIS 2018, p. 214ff; GESIS 2020, p. 260ff).
31 ONBound variable: rel_stachu1a including ISSP 1991; EVS 1999 and 2008; and WVS 2001 and 2006, see the numbers in Table A4.
32 ONBound variable: natid_bound5a including ASES_2001; EVS_2017; IntUne_2007; IntUne_2009; ISSP_1995; ISSP_2003; ISSP_2013;
and PewGAP_2016. See the numbers in Table A4.
33 See the numbers in Table A4.
34 Reference category: female.
35 Reference category: high education.
36 Reference category: fuzzy.
37 Reference category: before 2000 (1981–1999).
38 Interaction term of Religious*Soc_background is not significant.
39 Interaction term of Religious*Index CHST_RDI_GLOR = −0.002.
40 0.061156 (intercept country variance) + 0.515529 (Residual) = 0.576685.
41 0.061156/0.576685 = 0.11.
42 Earlier research has already examined specific religions in this respect. The phenomenon of “Orthodox atheism” is examined by
Ładykowska (2016). For the phenomenon of Jewish atheism, see Berlinerblau (2013).
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